

# A Refutation of Primer On The Reality of The Immaterial by Alexander Iulianus

By The Author of Templist Canon

The work being refuted is [here](#). The work is archived [here](#). It is necessary to follow along. The numbers and titles below correspond to the numbers and titles of his argument.

## FIRST

1. Ok.

2. “Only things that are real could inform me of my own reality.” Why *must* you be informed of your own reality? You only *must* be informed of your own reality if your experiences are of real things. Whether or not your experiences are of real things is what you are trying to prove.

“Only things that are real could act upon me as a real thing.” This is not relevant to the question of the reality of experiences. It is possible to be acted upon by real things yet never to experience them.

3. Relies on #2 which is invalid. However it need not rely on #2, because the conclusion is self-evident: you are real, external things are real, external things can act upon you. Rational arguments are not necessary to establish these facts.

In light of this, this #3 is fine if by “substance” it is meant “basic material”.

4. Ok.

5. Ok.

## SECOND

1. I believe this means that no two contradictory elements can exist in reality. This is to say, in the typical sense of the word, that contradictions are real. Indeed, this is the definition of a contradiction. For example, “there is pizza in your wardrobe” and “there is not pizza in your wardrobe” are contradictions because they cannot both be true. He is inverting the definition of “contradiction” by confusing “contradictory elements” with “contradictions”. Let it be remembered therefore that he means to say: I know that contradictions exist.

Or, maybe he really believes that contradictions are impossible, that everything is true (or false) simultaneously. This is obviously false.

2. A contradiction is a set of opposite propositions, but not every opposite is a contradiction. Therefore to refute contradictions (which he has not actually done in #1) is not to refute all opposites. Water and fire are opposites but not contradictions.

The definition of an opposite is not very ironclad. It generally means something that is the same in nature but different by approximately equidistant degree. Thus the opposite of 100 degrees warm is 100 degrees cold, both being temperatures in nature. Thus is fire the opposite of water, both being elements in nature. It is

possible to conceptualize many things this way, and it is done intuitively so that the typical definition of “opposite” is not very consistent.

This alone refutes the rest of the argument as it is based on the nonexistence of opposites.

3. Ok.

4. Ok.

5. The concepts “alteration, impact, interaction” are introduced here irrelevantly. Hitherto, “relation” meant a conceptual relation, not a causal relation. There is therefore equivocation on the definition of “relation”. The only relevant part of this #5 is “in accord with how they relate”, which begs the question to establish “all things must be related”. It is however not important because this #5 is an “extra”, “further” point. #4 was sufficient to move to #6.

6. If opposites and contradictions were impossible, everything would be exactly alike. It would not only eliminate the distinction between “real” and “unreal”, making all things “real”, but every other possible distinction. This conclusion, that therefore everything is “real”, does not properly grasp the consequences of the argument. Alexander interpreted the consequences to mean: there must be one thing which everything has in common. The consequence actually would be: everything has everything in common.

This alone also refutes the rest of the argument, which bases itself on this very particular “realness” similarity rather than the actual consequence of the argument, were it not already refuted in #2.

7. This says the same thing as #6, several times over. It introduces the word “unity” which means the same thing as common congeniality. It says that unity of all real things is the cause of common congeniality of all real things, which means that it causes itself, which is false.

Unless, however, by “fundamental unity” he means “the abstract principle of unity hitherto established”, and by “common congeniality” he means “realness”. Thus, he is saying that the abstract principle gives everything realness in common. This type of empty abstract concept would be enabled by the misunderstanding I pointed out in #6. It is enabled because he has supposedly identified a principle, but he is “missing” the principle itself. That principle being: all things are exactly alike. Not possessing the substance of the principle, he may think he has something called “a principle as such”, when in fact he has only an empty idea which he has failed to fill with its meaning.

8a. Ok.

8b. Ok.

8c. This is not true. Realness of a given thing is not established by relation to other things, but by observation of the given thing. If only I could observe myself, I would know myself to be real. No matter if I can drink a soda or not. If realness were only established by relation, it would be impossible to reckon anything as real. For, nothing would be real in itself, and thus nothing would interact or relate to a real thing.

9. I have seen this type of argument before. It is fallacious, but needs only one more premise to be valid.

First a response to the fallacious form: If we were not real, we could not opine that we were not real. Yet, “opining” is not a part of the question of “are we real or are we not real?” Opining is an action that humans

perform. Philosophical questions are disembodied. It doesn't matter if we "opine" them or not. All that matters is: "are we real or are we not real?" Perhaps we are not real, and we cannot opine. There is nothing internally contradictory about such a position, because my ability to speak such a position aloud is not a part of the position itself.

To fix the fallacy: The missing premise is that *I can opine on not being real*. If we were not real, we could not opine that we were not real, *yet I can opine that I am not real*. This changes it into an entirely different kind of argument. The argument is not, "it is self refuting", but "it is false". This version of the argument is not fallacious.

10. This is not established by #9 alone but acceptably follows from the previous points.

### THIRD

1. Ok but remember #6.

2a. This is the definition of congeniality.

2b. I fear Alexander may not understand the origin of "distinction", since he has not elaborated on it. An apple is distinct from other apples because it has different qualities compared to those apples, including that it occupies different space. In light of this, it is not true that an apple is distinct on the "same basis" with everything. For, with some things it is distinct primarily in space, but with other things it is distinct in space and in form, and with other things in color, and with other things in behavior, and so on.

2c. Ok.

2d. Ok.

3. The unity of reality precludes "nothing" which is another way of saying "not anything".

4. Ok.

5. Ok.

6a. Ok.

6b. Every unity participates in the first unity: reality. Why does this mean that the criterion remains constant? This is a non sequitur.

This non sequitur is demonstrated by the fact that the points just previous to #6b could stand on their own, without need of the argument re: the nonexistence of opposites. In fact, on 6a I nearly commented: notice that the initial argument re: the nonexistence of opposites is no longer relevant. It was as good as a literary device to get him to where he is now. He is now discussing the fundamental nature of likeness, unlikeness.

This means that, though he may contend so, the refutations that applied to the "nonexistence of opposites argument" no longer taint the entire argument, and he is free from them.

7. Ok.

## FOURTH

1. Ok. Skepticism on the last sentence, but need more of an idea what he is talking about.
2. This is not true. Imagine a synthetic apple. Said synthetic apple would be different from other apples in being produced synthetically, but would share all other apple traits. It would still be considered an apple, due to its overwhelming likeness aside from being produced synthetically.

This is not a “neat” explanation, because then there is not any certain thing which qualifies an apple as an apple. This has nothing to do with whether it is true. Conceptual designations do not work in “neat” ways because humans are not usually autistic. An apple ceases to be an apple when it loses *many* similarities to other apples so as to become intuitively unrecognizable, not only when it loses one “essential” similarity.

This relates to the word “apple”, which is a concept. However, there are a number of possible concepts of a more particular nature which we may or may not have words for. For example, there is not a word for a red apple with one bruise in X specific spot, but this is a valid category. There is not a word for a green apple fused to a red apple using stitches, but this is a valid category.

All observable categories are real, small or big. Words are another matter. There are innumerable possible categories, some of which we do not even think of, such as “a computer-near-lamp-post”.

Although he doesn’t understand it this way, let us imagine therefore that Alexander is not really talking about the category called “apple”, but another category. This category, which is just as real as any other observable category, is “a fruit that comes from an apple tree”. For clarity, this category shall be called “AutistApple”.

3. Apple trees have a genetic recipe which, constantly being used to create the tree, and changing in its expression by the season, causes the production of AutistApples if the proper nutrients are in place. Why must it contain the unity of AutistApples within itself, to accomplish this task? Is Alexander again conflating “conceptual relation” with “causal relation”? There is a causal relation between apples and apple trees. What else? What is the “unknown mode”? The mode through which apple trees produce apples is precisely known and is not at all dependent upon a relation of concepts. It is dependent on the relation of causes.

4. Most cultivated apple trees are grown by grafting btw. This isn’t really that relevant because then his argument simply extends also to grafts. Although it is relevant to previously mentioned points, in that said trees are still considered to be apple trees. Yet, they are not AutistAppleTrees, defined as that category of trees which grow from apple seeds.

Alexander has entered non sequitur land. What is this about seeds needing to “know” the unity of apple trees? The growth of an apple tree from a seed is a purely mechanical process the causal chain of which is entirely explicable. What, in light of that, is he talking about?

5. More nonsense, but ok.

6. Here we have defined a chain of biological continuity as an “essence”. Alright. It is true that they possess a unity in sharing this cycle together. This is yet another category, the “essence”, or more literally the general concept of the AutistAppleCycle.

7. Ok.

8. Ok.

9. Yes, and therefore DNA is not to be identified with the “essence”. The essence is simply a word which describes the (real, not merely nominal) category of the AutistAppleCycle.

In the forgoing points, you will see something interesting. Since “essence” was originally defined as a chain of continuity, or in other words a cycle, and since life is cyclical, but not all inorganic processes are cyclical, Alexander loses the point. He begins to talk about the *similarity between atoms* and the possible *origin of atoms* yet never describes it in terms of a *cycle*.

It is necessary for his conception to be cyclical. For, the AutistApple is defined by the AutistAppleTree, and the AutistAppleTree is defined by the AutistAppleSeed, and the AutistAppleSeed is defined by the AutistApple. All depend on each other for their AutistCategory. If this were not a cycle, the last thing in the cycle would cease to be itself, as would the next thing, and the next thing.

The atomic theory that he is about to espouse is not a cycle. It posits a “first particle”. As such that particle can not belong to any AutistCategory, nor can it partake of an essence.

Accordingly, though probably unintentionally, you will see that he completely bastardizes his own definition of “essence” (see below), and the rest of the argument rests upon that unexplained bastardization.

10. A mistake is made: “accounting for the essence being *responsible* for the continuity of likeness-”. Hitherto, essence was defined as the cycle itself. Now essence is the cause of that cycle, or its animating force. Alexander has TOTEMIZED the “essence”, from a mere definition describing the category of the AutistAppleCycle, to a GREAT SPIRIT, though in fact such a great spirit is not an observable entity in any way, nor has any argument been provided for it.

In this TOTEM he finds the missing piece to his previous non sequiturs, the “thing which informs” other things how to be. This entire explanatory model, to begin with, was unfounded per response to #3. Saving an unfounded explanatory model with more bullshit, many such cases.

11. Fallacy of composition. I am reminded of the fallacy that was famously made by the *vitalist* school of thought.

12. Ok.

13. My assertion re: causal explanation begins to receive an answer here.

14. Of course, option one is false. Option two is not the only remaining option. The other option is: at a certain level of size, the behavior of particles simply is what it is. This is not actually different from option two, except in the number of particles.

This is a crucial difference, because: the number of tiny particles is obviously large, and there is no evidence of a “one fundamental and original particle”, nor is there any evidence that particles can coalesce into such a particle, nor is there any evidence that particles can spawn new particles. Shall we prefer the explanation with evidence, or the explanation with none?

15. Ok.

16. Here we have this “essence Totem” again, which enables Alexander to opine on a hypothetical particle for which there is no evidence. I remind you that “essence” transformed from a concrete concept to a Totem in #10. Now you can see the destruction it wreaks upon his worldview.

17. Ok.

## FIFTH

1. A uniform and identical *series* of things is not actually uniform and identical, for it differs in space and position. It is from space and position that variations occur as a result of atoms. Let us suppose, though, that when Alexander says “uniform and identical things” he *really means it*, and is talking about one undifferentiated thing. Just one particle, where no other particles exist yet.

As the world consists of multiple particles, between which exist empty space, which can never combine into one particle, but can only associate in clusters with thin empty spaces between them, it is not evident that such a “one” particle can exist. Nor do particles ever generate other particles.

Still, let us suppose such a singular particle, since it is the only thing that saves him.

2. The essence, remember, was initially defined in #6 as a material thing. At any rate, a material thing in the same way that a “moving car” is a material thing. It was a category that included all of the pieces involved in the AutistAppleCycle, and the movement of those pieces. It was the cycle itself. What is it now? Immaterial? How did it become this? No reason has ever been provided to describe its transformation, its ascension.

3. Ok.

4. Ok.

5. Ok.

6. Ok.

## “THUS”

“In deducing this, we have found the beginning of the whole divine order of souls, daemons, and gods, of whom form the basis for our reality and are responsible for everything that fills it.”

Non sequitur. Even supposing the reality of the “totemized” version of the “essence”, what does this have to do with souls, daemons, gods? With ethereal anthropomorphic powerful entities, with the spiritual part of man? It has ASCENDED even past TOTEM. It has now become that great testament to philosophical folly, the VAGUE VIBE OF SOME KIND. For, the TOTEM is ETHEREAL and UNOBSERVABLE and IMMATERIAL, and in some VAGUE, VIBEY way of MERE HUNCH ASSOCIATION, the GODS, SOULS, and DAEMONS who are ALSO ETHEREAL and IMMATERIAL, but who DO NOT have other qualities in common with the TOTEM, nonetheless have a SIMILAR VIBE.